The Full Impact of the Affordable Care Act on Political Participation by Courtemanche, Charles J. et al.
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
Economics Faculty Publications Economics 
7-2020 
The Full Impact of the Affordable Care Act on Political 
Participation 
Charles J. Courtemanche 
University of Kentucky, courtemanche@uky.edu 
James Marton 
Georgia State University 
Aaron Yelowitz 
University of Kentucky, aaron.yelowitz@uky.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/economics_facpub 
 Part of the Health Economics Commons 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Repository Citation 
Courtemanche, Charles J.; Marton, James; and Yelowitz, Aaron, "The Full Impact of the Affordable Care 
Act on Political Participation" (2020). Economics Faculty Publications. 9. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/economics_facpub/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Economics Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, 
please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
The Full Impact of the Affordable Care Act on Political Participation 
Notes/Citation Information 
Published in RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences, v. 6, no. 2. 
© 2020 Russell Sage Foundation 
This article is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported 
License. 
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) 
https://doi.org/10.7758/rsf.2020.6.2.08 
This article is available at UKnowledge: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/economics_facpub/9 
Charles Courtemanche is associate professor of economics at the University of Kentucky and director of the 
Institute for the Study of Free Enterprise. James Marton is professor of economics at Georgia State University. 
Aaron Yelowitz is professor of economics at the University of Kentucky. 
© 2020 Russell Sage Foundation. Courtemanche, Charles, James Marton, and Aaron Yelowitz. 2020. “The Full 
Impact of the Affordable Care Act on Political Participation.” RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the 
Social Sciences 6(2): 179–204. DOI: 10.7758/RSF.2020.6.2.08. We thank Emily Dunlap for expert research as-
sistance. We also thank the editors, Andrea Campbell and Lara Shore- Sheppard, three anonymous referees, and 
participants at University of Kentucky’s brownbag economics lunch and the Russell Sage Foundation Social, 
Political, and Economic Effects of the Affordable Care Act conference for helpful comments. Direct correspon-
dence to: Charles Courtemanche at courtemanche@uky.edu, Department of Economics, 244 Gatton Business 
& Economics Building, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY 40506; James Marton at marton@gsu.edu, Depart-
ment of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, P.O. Box 3992, Atlanta, 
GA 30302; and Aaron Yelowitz at aaron@uky.edu, Department of Economics, 225H Gatton Business & Econom-
ics Building, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY 40506.
Open Access Policy: RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences is an open access journal. 
This article is published under a Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial- NoDerivs 3.0 Unported Li-
cense.
sector itself. Despite this, most of the existing 
ACA literature has focused on effects within the 
health- care sector. Moreover, much of the lit-
erature interested in estimating causal effects 
has examined the impact of individual compo-
nents of the ACA, such as the Medicaid expan-
sion, alone (Kaestner et al. 2017; Simon, Soni, 
and Cawley 2017; Maclean and Saloner 2019).
Fewer causal studies examine not only the 
ACA Medicaid expansion, but also the other pri-
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This article examines the impact of both the Medicaid expansion and the private insurance- related compo-
nents of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on voter turnout and registration. We employ a difference- in- 
difference- in- differences identification strategy exploiting variation over time, state Medicaid expansion 
status, and within- state local area pre- ACA uninsured rates. Using data between 2006 and 2016 from the 
November Current Population Survey and the Census Bureau’s Small Area Health Insurance Estimates, our 
results suggest little effect of the ACA on voter turnout or registration.
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t h e  I m pA c t  o n  p o l I t I c A l 
pA r t I c I pA t I o n
According to the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, the share of U.S. gross do-
mestic product devoted to health- care spend-
ing rose from 13.4 to 17.3 percent between 2000 
and 2009. Thus, the major changes to such an 
important part of the economy brought on by 
the passage of the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010 were antici-
pated to have broad social, political, and eco-
nomic effects extending beyond the health- care 
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1. Wesleyan Media Project, “2018: The Health Care Election,” October 18, 2018, http://mediaproject.wesleyan.
edu/releases/101818-tv (accessed January 9, 2020).
2. This approach mimics the earlier work of Amy Finkelstein (2007), who studied the initial introduction of 
Medicare, and Sarah Miller (2012), who studied Massachusetts’s health reform.
vate components of the ACA implemented in 
2014 at the same time. Several works document 
gains in health insurance coverage coming 
from both the Medicaid expansion and the 
other components of the ACA (Courtemanche 
et al. 2016, 2017, 2019b; Frean, Gruber, and Som-
mers 2017). Molly Frean, Jonathan Gruber, and 
Benjamin Sommers (2017) estimate that 60 per-
cent of the coverage gains occurring in 2014 and 
2015 can be attributed to the Medicaid expan-
sion with the other 40 percent being attributed 
to subsidized Marketplace coverage. Others 
have examined the impact of the ACA on self- 
assessed health, access to care, and risky health 
behaviors (Courtemanche et al. 2018a, 2018b, 
2019a). These studies tend to find that any im-
pact of the ACA on these outcomes is driven by 
the non- Medicaid expansion components of 
the law.
Looking beyond effects within the health- 
care sector, the purpose of this article is to 
 examine the impact of the ACA on civic engage-
ment through political participation, specifi-
cally voter turnout and registration. The 2010 
congressional election, where Republicans 
picked up sixty- three seats in the House of Rep-
resentatives, may have served as a referendum 
on the ACA. Conversely, Democrats picked up 
forty seats in the 2018 congressional election 
where health care and the potential repeal of 
the ACA were major issues. During the 2018 
election cycle, health care was the dominating 
issue in campaign ads, where pro- Democratic 
ads featured the issue 47 percent of the time, 
and the overall issue of preexisting conditions 
was front and center.1 Those most likely to be 
uninsured prior to the ACA (the young, minor-
ities, and the low income) traditionally have 
low voter turnout. If the debate surrounding 
the ACA mobilized these new constituencies, 
then changes in political participation due to 
the ACA may have broader social impacts be-
yond changes in health policy.
Our primary empirical approach involves es-
timating difference- in- difference- in- differences 
(DDD) models, with differences coming from 
time, state Medicaid expansion status, and lo-
cal area pre- ACA uninsured rates (Courteman-
che et al. 2017). The third difference leverages 
the fact that the ACA is expected to have a stron-
ger impact in areas with higher pre- ACA unin-
sured rates.2 This approach allows us to identify 
the effect of the private components of the ACA 
separately from the Medicaid expansion. Our 
baseline DDD model includes the full voting 
eligible population (U.S. citizens age eighteen 
or older) using the November 2006–2016 Cur-
rent Population Survey (CPS). We also consider 
heterogeneity in the impact of the ACA within 
demographic groups (age, race, and income). 
Focusing on subgroups can help identify par-
ticular constituencies who may have responded 
to the ACA in different manners.
Our empirical approach and use of the CPS 
extends the ACA and voting literature in several 
ways. First, we estimate the impact of both the 
Medicaid expansion and the private compo-
nents of the ACA on political participation. The 
ACA- related gains for private coverage for more 
affluent individuals affected approximately 
eleven million Americans (CMS n.d.). Second, 
our principal results rely on individual- level mi-
crodata, allowing us to control for a broad set 
of individual covariates as well as by subgroup 
and type of election. Finally, we include con-
trols for economic and political environment, 
including voting reforms that may separately 
affect turnout and registration.
Across a variety of specifications, we typi-
cally find small and insignificant effects of the 
ACA on turnout or registration, in contrast to 
earlier work. But we don’t know why. The evolv-
ing literature on Medicaid’s valuation and the 
health effects of the ACA is mixed (Finkelstein, 
Hendren, and Shepard 2019; Gruber and Som-
mers 2019), possibly suggesting a smaller mo-
bilization effect than one may anticipate. The 
political science concept of the “delegated” or 
“submerged” welfare state suggests that those 
gaining coverage may not be fully aware that 
they are benefiting from a public program (Met-
tler 2011; Morgan and Campbell 2011).
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To date, two published studies examine the im-
pact of the ACA’s Medicaid expansions on voter 
turnout and registration. Jake Haselswerdt 
(2017) examines voter turnout in a difference- 
in- difference (DD) framework (relying on varia-
tion across states and over time) with district- 
level turnout data from the 2012 presidential 
election and 2014 congressional election for the 
435 congressional districts across all fifty U.S. 
states. He finds robust evidence that increased 
Medicaid enrollment is associated with higher 
turnout and likely due to both increased par-
ticipation by new beneficiaries and backlash. 
The point estimates imply that for every hun-
dred individuals who gained Medicaid coverage 
due to the ACA expansions, between fifty- one 
and 113 others turned out to vote in 2014 (Ha-
selswerdt 2017, 683).
This enormous magnitude could potentially 
reflect spillovers, newly engaged Medicaid re-
cipients spreading enthusiasm (or reflecting 
backlash) to others whose coverage status did 
not change. Alternatively, it could be driven by 
methodological issues. The DD research design 
assumes that, conditional on controls, changes 
in voter turnout between 2012 and 2014 would 
have been the same in expansion and non- 
expansion states in the absence of the ACA. 
Given only one period of pre- ACA data, it is not 
possible to examine pretreatment trends to 
evaluate the validity of this assumption. More-
over, comparing a presidential election year 
with a congressional election year increases the 
risk of confounding. If the dip in turnout in 
congressional relative to presidential elections 
differs systematically between Republican- and 
Democratic- majority states, the identifying as-
sumption would be violated. In contrast, we use 
a DDD research design that allows for differen-
tial trends between expansion and non- 
expansion states as long as this difference is 
uncorrelated with pre- ACA uninsured rates. 
Moreover, we separately examine both presi-
dential and congressional elections with mul-
tiple pretreatment years.
Joshua Clinton and Michael Sances (2018) 
examine Medicaid’s effect on turnout and reg-
istration using a DDD framework (relying on 
variation across states, over time, and by the 
percentage of near- poor adults in a county) and 
county- level elections data for thirty- two states, 
comparing changes in the 2010 and 2014 con-
gressional elections and changes in the 2012 
and 2016 presidential elections. In their most 
carefully controlled specifications, they find 
that the ACA Medicaid expansion increased 
voter registration by up to 4 percentage points 
in 2014 (effects persisting through 2016) and in-
creased voter turnout in 2014 by up to 2.4 per-
centage points, though this estimate is not sta-
tistically significant. Further, they do not find 
any impact on voter turnout in 2016.
Their methodology is similar to ours in that 
it includes a third difference meant to capture 
treatment intensity and separately examines 
presidential and congressional elections. Ac-
cordingly, their magnitudes are much more 
modest than those of Haselswerdt (2017). None-
theless, this article contributes in several ways. 
First, we move beyond the Medicaid expansion 
and estimate the effect of the ACA’s expansion 
of private coverage. Second, by using individual 
rather than aggregate data, we are able to exam-
ine how the effects differ across demographic 
groups. Next, we include multiple pretreatment 
periods to enable the evaluation of pre- trends. 
Finally, we use a more direct intensity mea-
sure—pretreatment uninsured rate rather than 
proportion low income—in an effort to obtain 
more precise estimates.
Several single- state studies also explore the 
impact of Medicaid prior to the ACA on turnout 
and registration. Katherine Baicker and Amy 
Finkelstein (2018) find that new Medicaid cov-
erage for previously uninsured, non- elderly 
adults in Oregon led to an increase in voter 
turnout in the 2008 presidential election, but 
not the 2010 congressional elections. They 
identify the impact of Medicaid on individuals 
from the random assignment of coverage gen-
erated from the Oregon Health Insurance Ex-
periment, and merge lottery assignment and 
Medicaid coverage status to individual voter 
data on registration and turnout. The causal 
impact of individual Medicaid coverage is to 
increase the individual’s likelihood of voter 
turnout in 2008 by up to 2.5 percentage points 
(from a baseline of roughly 33 percent), with 
larger effects for some subgroups. The impact 
on voter turnout in November 2010 suggests a 
decline in voting, but the point estimates are 
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3. Michener (2017) examines voter turnout (and other forms of civic participation) for almost all counties in the 
United States in the 2000, 2004, and 2008 presidential elections, where the key independent variable is per-
centage of children enrolled in Medicaid. The estimate is unlikely to be causal because it is not based on quasi- 
experimental policy variation.
4. However, Jacqueline Chattopadhyay (2017) finds that young adults show virtually no signs of political feed-
backs from the dependent coverage provision.
5. HealthCare.gov, “Pre- existing Condition Insurance Plan (PCIP), https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/pre 
-existing-condition-insurance-plan-pcip (accessed January 9, 2020).
6. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
not significant. The impact on voter registra-
tion is roughly the same magnitude as on turn-
out, although the results are not significant. 
Haselswerdt and Jamila Michener (2019) exam-
ine major changes to TennCare that, by late 
2005, led to the removal of 170,000 Medicaid 
adult recipients in Tennessee. They use voter 
turnout data across the ninety- five counties in 
Tennessee in the 2006 and 2002 congressional 
elections (which also coincided with the guber-
natorial election); their point estimates imply 
that for every hundred individuals who lost 
TennCare coverage, between twenty- four and 
thirty- six fewer individuals voted.
Although the results from these two single- 
state studies suggest the same- signed direction 
(expanding Medicaid leads to short- run in-
creases in voting, and contracting TennCare 
leads to short- run decreases), the estimates are 
different by an order of magnitude. Possible 
explanations include heterogeneous treatment 
effects across states, a lack of symmetry in the 
effects of expansions and contractions, or bi-
ased estimates in the latter study from differ-
ential underlying trends in voter turnout be-
tween heavily and lightly treated Tennessee 
counties. 
In summary, most existing studies focus ex-
clusively on Medicaid reforms and find mixed 
effects on turnout and registration, although 
the data, methods, magnitudes, and statistical 
significance vary substantially. Evidence from 
the previous ACA literature suggests short- run 
positive impacts that fade over time; evidence 
from Medicaid variation outside the ACA sug-
gests mixed impacts.3 To date, little focus has 
been on the full effect of the ACA, even though 
substantial numbers of people gained private 
coverage, often highly subsidized. Given that 
the ACA represents a coverage expansion, we 
might expect our results to be more closely 
aligned to those from the Oregon study (Baicker 
and Finkelstein 2018) than the Tennessee study 
(Haselswerdt and Michener 2019).
legIsl AtIve HIstory
President Obama signed the ACA into law on 
March 23, 2010. Although the major provisions 
are well known, we highlight a number of fea-
tures where the ACA could create political con-
stituencies that affect political participation. 
The ACA implemented some popular, immedi-
ate reforms in 2010 related to young adults, life-
time limits, and individuals with preexisting 
conditions. The dependent coverage provision 
allowed young adults to be covered by their par-
ent’s health insurance plan until age twenty- six. 
This provision affected approximately 938,000 
young adults (Antwi, Moriya, and Simon 2013) 
and would potentially create constituencies with 
both young adults and their middle- aged par-
ents.4 The ACA also eliminated lifetime dollar 
limits on insurance coverage for essential ben-
efits such as hospital stays. More than 16 percent 
of covered workers with single coverage had a 
lifetime limit of $2 million or less in 2009; over-
all, 59 percent had some lifetime maximum 
(Claxton et al. 2009). The ACA also established 
a transitional program known as the Pre- 
Existing Condition Insurance Plan that launched 
in summer 2010 and ended in 2014 with the ma-
jor rollout of the ACA. It targeted those who were 
uninsured for at least six months, had a preex-
isting condition, and were denied coverage by a 
private insurance company.5 At its peak, in Feb-
ruary 2013, approximately 115,000 individuals 
were enrolled (CMS n.d.).
Based on the June 2012 decision in National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 
several major parts of the ACA were clarified.6 
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7. Here efficacy represents the extent to which an individual believes the government listens to people like them.
8. They also find that citizenship has a substantial effect on turnout; in our empirics, we focus on the vote- eligible 
population (citizens, age eighteen and older).
Most important, the Supreme Court upheld the 
individual mandate to buy health insurance as 
a constitutional exercise of Congress’s taxing 
power. It also ruled that expanding Medicaid 
was not a valid exercise of Congress’s spending 
power because it would coerce states to accept 
the expansion or risk losing existing Medicaid 
funding.
The ACA rollout in 2014 included both a pri-
vate portion and a public portion. The private 
portion improved the functioning of the non-
group health insurance market for consumers 
who did not have access to employer- provided 
or public coverage (Gruber 2011). Provisions in-
cluded community rating, guaranteed issue, 
and minimum coverage requirements. It also 
established a health insurance marketplace, 
commonly referred to as the federal exchange. 
Each state was given the option of establishing 
its own insurance exchange; fifteen did so in 
2014 (KFF 2019b). It created penalties for those 
who did not comply with the individual man-
date, which could reach as high as the annual 
premium for the national average price of a 
bronze exchange plan. It also created sliding 
scale subsidies in the form of premium tax 
credits for consumers with incomes between 
100 and 400 percent of the federal poverty level 
(FPL) who do not qualify for other affordable 
coverage, such as Medicaid. It also created cost- 
sharing reductions for individuals who pur-
chased a silver plan in the exchange and had 
incomes under 250 percent of the FPL. The pub-
lic portion expanded Medicaid. In states that 
opted to expand Medicaid via the ACA, Medic-
aid is available up to 138 percent of the FPL (for 
private coverage, subsidies are available for 
those between 138 and 400 percent of the FPL). 
This suggests a major expansion of Medicaid 
eligibility via the ACA for low- income childless 
adults.
Both the private and public portions of the 
major ACA rollout strengthen the insurance 
market, which in turn creates new constituen-
cies that could be mobilized to vote. Although 
the current uninsured are the most natural con-
stituency from these provisions, the impact 
likely goes much further. Using administrative 
data from the Internal Revenue Service for 2015, 
Ithai Lurie and James Pearce (2019) classify 26.9 
million non- elderly individuals as uninsured 
as at a “point of interview” but a much larger 
72.9 million as uninsured “ever in year.” Volatil-
ity in income, insurance affordability, family 
structure, and job security put many currently 
insured people at risk of losing coverage.
ConCep tuAl effeCts:  
How sHould tHe ACA AffeCt  
polItICAl pArtICIpAtIon?
Why would the expansion of the ACA impact 
political participation? We draw on insights 
from the civic volunteerism model (CVM), 
which Kay Schlozman, Henry Brady, and Sidney 
Verba (2018) summarize, to explore this issue. 
The CVM explains forms of political participa-
tion (such as voter turnout or registration, vol-
unteering time, or contributing money) as aris-
ing from three factors. The first is resources 
(time, money, and civic skills). The second is 
political engagement (political interest, infor-
mation, efficacy, and partisanship).7 The third 
is mobilization (recruitment requests that can 
come through formal political campaigns or 
informal social networks through which one 
interacts with friends, family, neighbors, and 
so on). These factors in turn interact with fam-
ily background, schooling, and adult institu-
tions, as well as particular political issues. All 
three components—as well as their interac-
tions—lead to insights for how the ACA expan-
sions may (or may not) increase voter turnout 
or registration.
When segments of the population focus on 
a political issue with personal benefit, there is 
potential for much greater political participa-
tion. Schlozman, Brady, and Verba (2018, 77–78) 
find that “having a stake in a particular pol-
icy . . . has a strong additional impact on the 
likelihood of being active on issues related to 
that policy.” Specifically for voter turnout, they 
find that political interest, political informa-
tion, and partisan strength all have substantial 
effects.8
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9. Of those enrolled in Marketplace coverage in 2018, fully 87 percent received a premium tax credit and 53 
percent received cost- sharing reductions (for more, see Kaiser Family Foundation 2019a).
10. The question of whether Medicaid sends a stigmatizing message is debatable. Recent surveys have found 
that 74 percent of the public, including a majority of Democrats (84 percent), Independents (76 percent), and 
Republicans (61 percent) look favorably on Medicaid (Zirzinger, Wu, and Brodie 2017). 
This would suggest that targeted beneficia-
ries of the ACA might increase their voter turn-
out or registration because the ACA increased 
their resources by providing health insurance 
coverage. Of course, this depends on several 
factors. First, those gaining coverage through 
the ACA must value this coverage to perceive 
their resources as increasing. Second, they 
must also recognize that this gain in coverage 
is due to the ACA. Third, it depends on how the 
increase in resources interacts with the other 
factors in the CVM. For example, if the other 
factors tend to push an individual away from 
voting, then an increase in resources would 
have to be large enough to convince this indi-
vidual to vote.
Political engagement is particularly impor-
tant in influencing turnout. One element of en-
gagement is information. As mentioned, poten-
tial voters gaining coverage via the ACA may or 
may not associate this benefit with the ACA. For 
example, Jacqueline Chattopadhyay (2017) 
shows that the ACA dependent care provision 
does not affect political participation of young 
people, perhaps because the coverage is pro-
vided through employer- provided rather than 
public plans. Similarly, it is possible that those 
who purchased subsidized private coverage in 
the ACA marketplace did not associate the low 
premiums they received with the ACA.9
Why would an individual gaining coverage 
through the ACA not attribute this benefit to 
the ACA? An answer can be found in the con-
cept of the “delegated” or “submerged” welfare 
state (Mettler 2011; Morgan and Campbell 2011). 
The concept suggests that those gaining public 
benefits may not be fully aware that they are 
receiving them from a public program. This 
stems from the fact that it is becoming increas-
ingly common for public goods to be provided 
privately, thus obscuring whether the goods 
themselves are public or private. Someone gain-
ing insurance via a subsidized Marketplace 
plan administered by a private insurance com-
pany, such as Anthem or United, for example, 
may not consider the coverage to be public. If 
this is the case, then we may not expect those 
benefiting from the ACA to respond by chang-
ing their political participation.
Another component of political engagement 
is efficacy. It is also possible that the programs 
lack efficacy, signaling that the government 
does not listen to or care about people like the 
beneficiary. The individual mandate may be 
seen as negative, as an infringement on per-
sonal liberty, even though the intent is to help 
consumers by stabilizing insurance markets 
from adverse selection. Although millions of 
poor individuals signed up for Medicaid in ex-
pansion states, the program itself may be 
viewed as stigmatizing or poorly run, in turn 
sending a message to beneficiaries that they do 
not deserve a voice in politics. Michener (2017) 
argues that the Medicaid program conveys dis-
empowering messages.10
The third factor in the CVM is mobilization 
(see Rosenstone and Hansen 2002). Mobiliza-
tion efforts on both sides of the political debate 
surrounding the ACA have been ongoing since 
before 2010. Those who earn a living in the 
health- care sector may experience greater mo-
bilization given that changes to health policy 
may affect them both personally and profes-
sionally. Organizations such as the American 
Medical Association and the American Associ-
ation of Retired Persons, as well as lobbyists 
associated with the pharmaceutical industry 
and the insurance industry, are also involved in 
mobilization efforts. Presumably, these sorts of 
efforts will differentially affect different types 
of individuals.
As suggested, it is important to consider 
the interaction of these three factors rather 
than each in isolation. For example, even if 
Medicaid is viewed as efficacious and the in-
formation about the ACA’s role in providing 
the benefit is understood, some constituen-
cies lack resources to translate increased in-
formation into higher political participation. 
Schlozman, Brady, and Verba (2018) find evi-
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11. Individuals are vote eligible if they report themselves as citizens and age eighteen or older. In practice, we 
restrict our sample in several other ways, most importantly by confining our analysis to non- elderly adults.
12. United States Elections Project, “CPS Vote Over- Report and Non- Response Bias Correction,” 1994–2016, 
http://www.electproject.org/home/voter -turnout/cps-methodology (accessed January 9, 2020). Other examples 
of reweighting to account for underreporting include Bradley Hardy, Timothy Smeeding, and James Ziliak (2018), 
who examine SNAP participation, and Robert Hartley, Carlos Lamarche, and Ziliak (2017), who examine AFDC/
TANF participation.
dence that recipients of means- tested bene-
fits, who tend to have less education and lower 
income, are relatively uninterested in and un-
informed about politics. The bump given to 
their political participation by their interest in 
issues is not enough to overcome their other 
resource deficits, such as lack of time or 
money. Similarly, even if the ACA improved fi-
nancial security or health status for Medicaid 
beneficiaries (thus, increasing resources to 
new beneficiaries), the gain in resources may 
not have been enough to increase political 
participation, given the initial resource defi-
cits. For private coverage, the effects on re-
sources is less clear. Gaining private coverage 
would also improve financial security, al-
though some beneficiaries choose plans that 
entail substantial out- of- pocket costs (Pauly 
2017). Thus, private coverage reduces the risk 
an individual faces (and affects the variance of 
expenses), but the mean effect on expenditure 
may not change substantially. In sum, the 
CVM suggests important interrelated factors 
that influence the effect of the ACA on voter 
turnout.
dAtA
Our principal dataset is the 2006 to 2016 Voting 
and Registration Supplement to the CPS, pro-
duced in November of even- numbered years. 
Aram Hur and Christopher Achen (2013) argue 
that this supplement is widely respected and 
often used for studying voting behavior given 
to its data quality, sample sizes, and response 
rates. We restrict our empirical analysis to the 
vote- eligible population (VEP).11 The CPS asks 
a number of questions about voter behavior; we 
focus primarily on voter turnout, worded as “In 
any election some people are not able to vote 
because they are sick or busy or have some 
other reason, and others do not want to vote. 
Did (you/name) vote in the election held on 
Tuesday, November ——?” In some specifica-
tions, we examine whether the ACA affected 
voter registration, derived from the CPS ques-
tion “(Were you/Was name) registered to vote 
in the November —— election?”
In our primary analysis, we follow conven-
tional academic coding rules by restricting the 
VEP sample who answer the turnout question 
with yes or no, excluding individuals who re-
spond with don’t know, refused, and no re-
sponse. Official Census Bureau reports catego-
rize these answers into no, in part to due to 
well- known overreporting of voting driven by 
social desirability bias (Ansolabehere and 
Hersh 2012). Following the recommendation of 
Hur and Achen (2013), we drop all categories of 
missing turnout response, and adjust the CPS 
survey weights for overreporting using files 
from the United States Elections Project.12
The CPS is well suited to studying the full 
impact of the ACA on voter turnout using an 
approach similar to that of Courtemanche and 
his colleagues (2017, 2018a, 2018b, 2019a, 2019b) 
because it provides geographical information 
at the state level for all respondents, and at the 
county level for approximately 40 percent of re-
spondents. Over the entire 2006 to 2016 period, 
the CPS identifies 368 counties within the 
United States; however, only 193 are consis-
tently identified across all six surveys. These 
193 tend to be relatively large and represent 
around 38 percent of the total U.S. population, 
the average county population being around 
615,000 (approximately nine times larger than 
the counties or county- equivalents that are not 
identified). Following earlier work, we create a 
“rest of state” category for respondents who are 
either in an unidentified county or in one of the 
175 counties identified only intermittently from 
2006 to 2016. Ultimately, we have 242 geographic 
areas in our analysis. Among the vote- eligible 
population, we extract questions on voter par-
ticipation and registration along with demo-
graphic and socioeconomic characteristics. 
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13. These covariates, including family income, are commonly in individual- level analyses of voter turnout with 
the CPS VRS (see, for example, Holbein and Hillygus 2016). We have rerun our specifications excluding family 
income and employment status, and none of the conclusions change.
The covariates include respondent’s age, mari-
tal status, sex, educational attainment, race, 
employment status, and family income. We 
also control for whether the respondent self- 
reported voting status.13
We append a number of health policy vari-
ables that vary at the state or substate level to 
the CPS microdata. One key variable is pre-
treatment uninsured rate. For each of the local 
areas, we use the 2013 Small Area Health Insur-
ance Estimates (SAHIE) to compute the unin-
sured rate for adults age eighteen through 
sixty- four, as well as smaller subgroups age 
eighteen through thirty- nine, forty through 
forty- nine, and fifty through sixty- four, when 
appropriate (U.S. Census Bureau 2017). Varia-
tion in the rate of uninsured adults age eigh-
teen through sixty- four across areas is substan-
tial, varying from 5.3 percent to 51.1 percent, 
rates for younger adults being somewhat 
higher and those for older adults somewhat 
lower. Another important variable, commonly 
used in ACA studies, indicates the state- 
optional Medicaid expansions. Following 
Courtemanche and his colleagues (2018a), we 
code twenty- one states as non- expansion if 
they had not expanded by early 2015. According 
to the Kaiser Family Foundation (2019c), 
twenty- eight states (including the District of 
Columbia) participated in the Medicaid expan-
sion in 2014, two others implemented in early 
2015.
We also include several economic and po-
litical variables. One is the unemployment rate 
(which varies by local area and year) from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (2018). The local un-
employment rate ranges from 2.0 percent to 
17.2 percent. We also parameterize three po-
litical variables related to the voting process, 
each of which varies by state and year. The first 
relates to voter identification laws. We follow 
the National Conference for State Legislatures 
(NCSL) in classifying states in each election 
year as having strict laws requiring photo IDs, 
nonstrict laws requiring photo IDs, strict laws 
requiring nonphoto IDs, nonstrict laws requir-
ing nonphoto IDs, or no ID requirement (Un-
derhill 2020). For the 2018 election, thirty- five 
states had laws requesting or requiring voters 
to show some form of identification at the 
polls. The remaining fifteen states use other 
methods to verify voters, such as checking a 
signature against information on file. In our 
primary specification, we control for states not 
having any ID requirement. Between 2006 and 
2016, the number of states that adopted an ID 
requirement steadily grew from twenty- three 
to thirty- three. We also use the NCSL (2019b) 
to classify states with early voting. We explored 
definitions of early voting, which in Paul 
Gronke, Eva Galanes- Rosenbaum, and Peter 
Miller (2007) mean no- excuse in- person early 
voting, no- excuse absentee, vote- by- mail, or in- 
person absentee voting. The number of states 
with early voting has remained nearly con-
stant, thirty- six in 2006 and thirty- eight in 2016. 
Finally, a recent innovation to voting is auto-
matic registration; some states automatically 
register a person to vote, unless the person ac-
tively decides to opt- out of voter registration 
(NCSL 2019b). Although seventeen states and 
the District of Columbia authorized automatic 
registration by December 2018, only Georgia 
and Oregon implemented such laws in time for 
the 2016 election (Brennan Center for Justice 
2019).
Virtually all studies recognize that competi-
tiveness of elections and coattail effects from 
presidential, senatorial, or gubernatorial elec-
tions are likely to affect voter turnout (see, for 
example, Clinton and Sances 2018; Haselswerdt 
and Michener 2019). We control at the state- 
year level for a number of variables related to 
competitiveness, coattails, and partisanship. 
First, following Clinton and Sances (2018), we 
separately estimate the impact of the ACA for 
congressional elections (2006, 2010, and 2014) 
and presidential elections (2008, 2012, and 
2016). Second, for every state and year in our 
sample, we control for (when available) the dif-
ference in aggregate vote percentage for the 
candidates finishing in first and second place 
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14. The difference is usually computed from the vote percentages for the Democrat and Republican candidates. 
When no relevant race took place within a given state- year cell, we code the difference as 0, and also include a 
dummy variable for that race occurred.
for presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial 
elections.14 Third, we control for a state’s parti-
sanship by computing the difference in a state’s 
Republican vote percentage and Democrat vote 
percentage using the 2000 and 2004 presiden-
tial elections, prior to our CPS sample. We in-
teract this state- level characteristic with year 
dummies in all specifications.
Table 1 characterizes voter participation in 
the CPS over time for the full population age 
eighteen and older, as well as by age group, 
Medicaid expansion status, and pretreatment 
uninsured rate. To preserve comparability with 
published Census Bureau reports (File 2015, 
2018), we recode invalid voting responses as 
nonparticipation. Over the period examined, 
participation was approximately 17 percentage 
points higher in presidential elections than 
congressional elections; on average, approxi-
mately 45.1 percent participate in congressional 
elections and 62.3 percent in presidential elec-
tions. The highest participation was in the 2008 
election, when 63.6 percent of the vote- eligible 
population participated. Participation in-
creases markedly with age, especially in con-
gressional elections. On average, the youngest 
group (age eighteen through thirty- nine) had a 
52.4 percent turnout in presidential elections, 
compared with 71.1 percent for those age sixty- 
five and older. The youngest group also had 
substantially lower comparative participation 
in congressional elections; the gap in voter par-
ticipation for those age eighteen through thirty- 
nine was 23.1 percentage points (29.3 percent 
Table 1. Voter Participation Across Elections
Congressional Elections Presidential Elections
2006 2010 2014 2008 2012 2016
Age eighteen and older 47.8% 45.5% 41.9% 63.6% 61.8% 61.4%
Age eighteen through thirty-nine 32.0 29.9 25.9 55.5 50.5 51.2
Age forty through forty-nine 49.7 46.8 40.9 64.9 63.2 63.1
Age fifty through sixty-four 60.2 56.6 51.7 70.1 69.2 67.1
Age sixty-five and older 62.5 60.8 59.4 70.3 72.0 70.9
White 51.6 48.6 45.8 66.1 64.1 65.3
Nonwhite 36.7 37.4 33.1 56.8 56.1 52.7
Income under $50K 40.7 38.4 34.6 55.0 53.8 52.2
Income $50K or more 57.8 52.5 48.2 75.3 69.1 68.2
Medicaid expansion state 49.6 46.9 41.8 63.9 61.8 61.6
Non-expansion state 45.1 43.5 42.1 63.2 61.8 61.1
High uninsured state 45.8 44.9 41.1 62.4 60.1 59.9
Low uninsured state 50.5 46.5 43.1 65.3 64.3 63.6
Medicaid expansion, high uninsured 48.7 47.7 41.5 62.9 59.4 60.0
Medicaid expansion, low uninsured 50.2 46.3 42.1 64.6 63.6 62.8
Non-expansion, high uninsured 43.6 42.7 40.9 62.1 60.5 59.8
Non-expansion, low uninsured 52.1 47.4 48.1 68.7 67.8 67.7
Source: Authors’ tabulations of the Voter Registration Supplement from the 2006 to 2016 Current 
Population Survey.
Note: All percentages represent voter participation. Invalid voting responses coded as nonparticipation 
(File 2015, 2018). Medicaid expansion states are those that implemented an expansion for new adults 
by 2015. Low uninsured states are those that had an uninsured rate below the median state in 2013 
(15.3 percent, obtained from the 2013 SAHIE).
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15. The threshold for being in the lowest 10 percent of uninsured rates for an area was 11.4 percent. The thresh-
old for the highest 10 percent was 27.5 percent.
versus 52.4 percent), relative to just 10.2 per-
centage points (60.9 percent versus 71.1 per-
cent) for those age sixty- five and older. States 
that expanded Medicaid by 2015 (expansion 
states) had somewhat higher participation 
rates in congressional elections than non- 
expansion states, but virtually no difference in 
presidential elections. States with below- 
median uninsured rates had higher participa-
tion in all elections.
As to the impact of the ACA, table 1 reveals 
that the overall effect may be small and sensi-
tive to the type of election. Voter participation 
in presidential elections is remarkably stable, 
though somewhat higher in the historic 2008 
election. Voter participation has steadily de-
clined in congressional elections for many de-
mographic groups; in addition, disparities in 
participation across demographic groups are 
significant (File 2015). Voter participation drops 
off more pronouncedly for Medicaid expansion 
states relative to non- expansion states after 
ACA implementation in 2014. However, in the 
group of states with low uninsured rates (where 
the impact of the ACA should be smaller), we 
continue to see much larger voter participation 
changes in Medicaid expansion states com-
pared with non- expansion states. This poten-
tially suggests that the expansions are not re-
sponsible for the decline in voter participation.
Figure 1 draws on the CPS sample used in 
the empirical analysis (described further). Lo-
calities with low uninsured rates clearly have 
higher voter turnout than those with high 
rates.15 However, difference is minimal in the 
trends from the pre to post period for either 
presidential or congressional elections.
Table 2 shows health insurance coverage, 
derived from the SAHIE for 2011 through 2016. 
Overall, insurance coverage increased in 2014 
on implementation of the full ACA provisions 
and continued to increase through 2016. Cover-
age gains were larger among younger, non-
white, or less affluent adults. States that elected 
Source: Authors’ tabulations from the 2006 to 2016 CPS using weighting corrections (Hur and Achen 
2013). 
Note: Local areas are in the top 10 percent of uninsured if the rate of uninsured is above 27.4 percent. 
Local areas are in the bottom 10 percent of uninsured if the rate of uninsured is below 11.5 percent.
Figure 1. Voter Participation in Local Areas, by Rates
Presidential elections
Congressional elections
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
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to expand Medicaid in 2014 (or early 2015) had 
higher baseline insurance levels, and exhibited 
larger overall gains in coverage after implemen-
tation. The impact of the ACA was most dra-
matic in states that expanded Medicaid and 
had a high baseline uninsured rate. The bottom 
part of table shows the growth in coverage for 
the newly eligible adults (near- poor adults, 
those living under 138 percent of the FPL) and 
all other adults in both expansion and non- 
expansion states. Without question, near- poor 
individuals in expansion states saw the greatest 
increase in coverage—14.9 percentage points 
on average, translating into insurance gains of 
nearly 2.4 million non- elderly adults. However, 
other groups—near- poor adults in non- 
expansion states, and higher- income adults in 
both expansion and non- expansion states—
also experienced significant growth. Insurance 
gains for near- poor adults in non- expansion 
states were approximately 1.2 million (10.1 per-
centage points). Gains for higher- income adults 
from private coverage were approximately 7.2 
million or 5.4 percentage points in expansion 
states, and 4.8 million or 4.3 percentage points 
in non- expansion states. Overall, the insurance 
gains for near- poor, non- elderly adults in Med-
icaid expansion states made up approximately 
15 percent of all gains.
For our empirical work, starting from an ini-
tial 2006 through 2016 CPS sample of 914,152 
respondents, we restrict attention to the 567,706 
respondents in the vote- eligible population, 
that is, respondents age eighteen or older who 
are citizens of the United States. The sample is 
further restricted to the 490,053 respondents 
who provide yes or no answers to the voting 
question (Hur and Achen 2013). We remove a 
few respondents when we could not derive a 
local unemployment rate, as well as individuals 
Table 2. Health Insurance Coverage of Non-Elderly Adults, SAHIE (Various Years)
Pre-ACA Post-ACA
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Age eighteen through sixty-four 78.9% 79.2% 79.6% 83.6% 86.8% 87.9%
Age eighteen through thirty-nine 73.6 74.4 75.0 79.7 83.6 85.3
Age forty through forty-nine 80.5 80.6 80.8 84.4 87.2 88.0
Age fifty through sixty-four 85.5 85.4 85.4 88.8 91.2 91.7
White 84.9 85.2 85.5 88.5 91.1 91.8
Nonwhite 68.2 68.9 69.5 75.5 79.9 81.7
Income ≤ 400% FPL 69.8 70.4 71.0 76.6 80.8 82.2
Income > 400% FPL 93.4 93.5 93.3 94.7 95.6 95.9
Medicaid expansion state 81.2 81.5 81.8 86.3 89.7 90.9
Non-expansion state 75.4 75.8 76.1 79.5 82.4 83.4
High uninsured state 74.9 75.3 75.7 80.5 84.1 85.4
Low uninsured state 84.6 85.0 85.1 88.2 90.7 91.7
Medicaid expansion, high uninsured state 76.6 76.8 77.4 83.6 87.9 89.4
Medicaid expansion, low uninsured state 84.7 85.1 85.3 88.4 91.1 92.1
Non-expansion, high uninsured state 73.6 74.1 74.4 78.1 81.1 82.2
Non-expansion, low uninsured state 84.2 84.3 84.3 86.7 88.9 89.3
Medicaid expansion, ≤138% FPL 63.4 64.1 65.1 73.8 80.4 83.0
Medicaid expansion, >138% FPL 85.8 86.0 86.1 89.4 91.9 92.7
Non-expansion, ≤138% FPL 53.2 54.5 55.6 61.0 65.3 67.3
Non-expansion, >138% FPL 82.1 82.2 82.2 84.9 87.1 87.5
Source: Authors’ tabulations of the 2011 to 2016 model-based small area health insurance estimates. 
Note: Neither children nor senior citizens included in calculations. See https://www.census.gov/data/
datasets/time-series/demo/sahie/estimates-acs.html and https://www2.census.gov/programs-
surveys/sahie/technical-documentation/file-layouts/sahie-file-layout-2008-2017.pdf (accessed March 
5, 2020). 
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who had missing values for family income, leav-
ing a sample of 465,517 respondents. Finally, we 
exclude individuals older than sixty- four be-
cause the ACA was not intended to affect the 
health- care coverage of seniors (Courtemanche 
et al. 2017), leaving 371,015 respondents.
Table 3 shows selected summary statistics 
for the remaining CPS sample, as well as by year 
(full results in table A1).16 There are large swings 
in voter turnout across congressional and pres-
idential elections, but more muted swings in 
registration. Approximately 60 percent of re-
spondents lived in a state that expanded Med-
icaid. The local unemployment rate rises until 
2010, and then decreases after. Approximately 
56 percent of respondents self- report their vot-
ing and registration status; 44 percent had an-
other respondent report voting and registration 
for them.
empIrICAl fr Amework
We estimate both DD models examining the 
impact of the Medicaid expansions alone and 
DDD models that isolate both the public and 
private portions of the ACA. The DD specifica-
tion takes the form
  Vist =  β0 + β1(MEDICAIDs * POSTt) + β2Xist  
 + β3Pst + αs + τt + εist, (1)
where Vist is an indicator for whether individual 
i living in state s voted in election year t, MED-
ICAIDs indicates whether state s participated in 
the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, POSTt indicates 
whether time t is in the posttreatment period 
(2014 or later), Xist is the set of individual- level 
controls discussed, Pst is the set of state- level 
political variables, αs and τt are the state and 
election year fixed effects, and εist is the error 
term. Expansions states are those that adopted 
in 2014 or early 2015, and the posttreatment pe-
riod does not count for the specific timing of 
the expansion (see Courtemanche et al. 2019a). 
We do not include the MEDICAIDs and POSTt 
dummies separately because they are sub-
sumed by the state and year fixed effects. The 
coefficient of interest is β1, which represents the 
average effect of the Medicaid expansion on 
residents of expansion states. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering 
by state.
The DDD model adds a third layer of varia-
tion: pre- ACA uninsured rates across counties. 
This approach is based on the idea that areas 
where a greater percentage of residents are un-
insured experience larger treatments from 
large- scale health insurance expansions (see 
Courtemanche et al. 2017, 2018a, 2018b, 2019a, 
2019b). The model is
Vicst =  γ0 + γ1(MEDICAIDs * POSTt)  
 + γ2(UNINSUREDc * POSTt)  
 + γ3(UNINSUREDc * MEDICAIDs * POSTt)  
 + γ4Xicst + γ5Pst + θc + σt + μicst, (2)
where UNINSUREDc is the time- invariant pre- 
ACA uninsured rate in county c, θc and σt are 
county and year fixed effects, and μicst is the er-
ror term. In non- Medicaid expansion states, the 
effect of the ACA is given by γ2 * UNINSUREDc, 
We are especially interested in γ2 * UNINSUREDc, 
which is the effect at the mean county pretreat-
ment uninsured rate in our sample. Similarly, 
the effect of the Medicaid expansion is γ3 * UN-
INSUREDc, and its effect at the average pretreat-
ment uninsured rate is γ3 * UNINSUREDc. The 
impact of the “full ACA”—that is, both the Med-
icaid expansion and the so- called private por-
tion of the law that was implemented in all 
states—is therefore the sum of these terms, 
which is (γ2 + γ3) * UNINSUREDc with (γ2 + γ3) * 
UNINSUREDc being the total effect at the mean 
pre- ACA uninsured rate.
The key identifying assumption behind the 
impact of the Medicaid expansion in our DD 
model is that, conditional on the other control 
variables, any changes in voter turnout would 
have been the same in Medicaid expansion and 
non- expansion states had the expansion not oc-
curred. Our DDD model, on the other hand, has 
separate key identifying assumptions for the 
impact of the Medicaid expansion and for the 
impact of the private components of the ACA. 
The identifying assumption behind the impact 
of the Medicaid expansion in our DDD model 
is that, in the absence of the ACA, the differen-
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Table 3. Selected Summary Statistics from the 2006 to 2016 CPS Voter Registration Supplement
All Years 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Voted? 0.475
(0.499)
0.385
(0.486)
0.615
(0.487)
0.384
(0.486)
0.567
(0.496)
0.324
(0.468)
0.576
(0.494)
Registered to vote? 0.714
(0.452)
0.689
(0.463)
0.743
(0.437)
0.697
(0.459)
0.728
(0.445)
0.688
(0.463)
0.736
(0.441)
Post 2013? 0.354
(0.478)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
1
(0)
1
(0)
Percent 2013 uninsured 
Age eighteen through sixty-four 0.201
(0.063)
0.2
(0.063)
0.201
(0.063)
0.201
(0.063)
0.201
(0.064)
0.202
(0.064)
0.202
(0.063)
Age eighteen through thirty-nine 0.245
(0.071)
0.244
(0.071)
0.245
(0.071)
0.245
(0.071)
0.245
(0.072)
0.246
(0.072)
0.246
(0.071)
Age forty through forty-nine 0.189
(0.063)
0.188
(0.063)
0.189
(0.062)
0.189
(0.063)
0.189
(0.064)
0.19
(0.063)
0.19
(0.062)
Age fifty through sixty-four 0.146
(0.05)
0.145
(0.049)
0.146
(0.049)
0.145
(0.05)
0.146
(0.051)
0.146
(0.05)
0.146
(0.049)
State expanded Medicaid? 0.599
(0.49)
0.602
(0.49)
0.599
(0.49)
0.603
(0.489)
0.596
(0.491)
0.596
(0.491)
0.596
(0.491)
Local unemployment rate 0.066
(0.023)
0.046
(0.01)
0.058
(0.013)
0.096
(0.02)
0.08
(0.017)
0.062
(0.013)
0.049
(0.01)
No ID required to vote 0.472
(0.499)
0.533
(0.499)
0.508
(0.5)
0.495
(0.5)
0.465
(0.499)
0.451
(0.498)
0.398
(0.489)
State allows early voting 0.708
(0.455)
0.698
(0.459)
0.704
(0.457)
0.693
(0.461)
0.693
(0.461)
0.717
(0.45)
0.741
(0.438)
Automatic voter registration 0.008
(0.089)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0.044
(0.206)
Republican vote margin 2.08
(15.07)
2.22
(15.01)
2.19
(14.97)
1.91
(15.05)
2.06
(15.10)
2.08
(15.12)
2.07
(15.15)
No governor race 0.54
(0.50)
0.21
(0.41)
0.87
(0.34)
0.21
(0.41)
0.85
(0.36)
0.22
(0.41)
0.86
(0.35)
No presidential race 0.50
(0.50)
1.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
1.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
1.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
No Senate race 0.33
(0.47)
0.26
(0.44)
0.47
(0.50)
0.27
(0.44)
0.26
(0.44)
0.47
(0.50)
0.28
(0.45)
Governor race margin 6.51
(10.36)
13.94
(12.02)
2.49
(8.85)
9.58
(9.91)
1.59
(5.42)
10.93
(11.30)
1.23
(5.21)
Presidential race margin 7.56
(10.59)
0.00
(0.00)
14.92
(9.41)
0.00
(0.00)
14.97
(9.96)
0.00
(0.00)
15.09
(11.88)
Senate race margin 12.88
(14.38)
16.67
(15.72)
10.47
(13.78)
12.76
(13.51)
13.97
(13.08)
9.89
(15.52)
13.69
(13.61)
Sample size 371,015 59,107 56,586 64,125 65,488 63,718 61,991
Source: Authors’ tabulation using weighting corrections (Hur and Achen 2013). 
Note: Restricted to vote-eligible population age eighteen to sixty-four who answered the voting question.
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tials in voter turnout between high and low 
baseline uninsured rate areas in Medicaid ex-
pansion states would have evolved similarly to 
these differentials in non- expansion states. The 
identifying assumption behind the impact of 
the private (national) components of the ACA 
in our DDD model is that, in the absence of the 
ACA, any changes in our outcomes of interest 
would not have varied differentially by local 
area uninsured rates, conditional on the con-
trols. The DDD approach also requires poten-
tially restrictive functional form assumptions: 
the intensity of treatment is assumed to vary 
linearly with the pretreatment uninsured rate, 
and the ACA is assumed to have no causal im-
pact in a (hypothetical) county with no unin-
sured people. Accordingly, we consider γ1—the 
effect of expanding Medicaid at a 0 percent un-
insured rate—to represent unobserved state- 
level confounders rather than part of Medic-
aid’s causal effect.
In both the DD and DDD models, our iden-
tification strategy assumes that areas gaining 
more insurance coverage would potentially 
have more mobilization (and the conceptual 
model suggests that the mobilization would 
come mostly from those who gained coverage), 
but nothing in our identification strategy con-
strains that to be the case. For example, areas 
with higher uninsured rates are also likely to 
have a larger portion of the insured population 
at risk for losing coverage, and they too could 
be mobilized to vote. To the extent that indi-
viduals are mobilized by the ACA but not geo-
graphically concentrated (as could be the case 
for sicker individuals with preexisting condi-
tions or young adults covered by the dependent 
coverage mandate), our approach will not cap-
ture such mobilization.
mAIn results
Table 4 presents the regression results for our 
DD model. Columns (1) and (2) report results 
for the years of congressional elections (2006, 
2010, and 2014), while columns (3) and (4) re-
port the results for the presidential election 
years (2008, 2012, and 2016). The reason for this 
stratification is that the enormous differences 
in voter turnout between presidential and mid-
term elections documented in table 3 raise the 
possibility that the causal effect of the ACA 
could differ in the two types of elections. Be-
cause we only have one posttreatment year for 
both types (2014 for congressional, 2016 for 
presidential), it will not be possible to distin-
guish between differential effects by election 
type and effects that dissipate over time. Col-
umns (2) and (4) include time- varying political 
variables that control for voter identification 
laws, early voting laws, and automatic registra-
tion; columns (1) and (3) do not.
We report results both for the full sample of 
non- elderly adults and subsamples for race- 
ethnicity (non- Hispanic white versus other), 
age (eighteen through thirty- nine, forty through 
forty- nine, and fifty through sixty- four), and in-
come (less than and more than $50,000). We 
use the SAHIE pretreatment uninsured rates 
that correspond to each subsample. This is why, 
for instance, we do not stratify further within 
the age eighteen through thirty- nine category, 
because that is the narrowest age range for 
which SAHIE insurance information is avail-
able. Table 4 presents only the coefficient esti-
mate representing the impact of the ACA Med-
icaid expansion (for all other covariates, 
excluding geographic controls, see tables A2 
and A3).
In the full sample regression results pre-
sented in the top panel of table 4, the coeffi-
cient estimate in column (1) indicates that the 
Medicaid expansion reduced voter turnout in 
congressional elections by 4.0 percentage 
points (p- value = 0.121) relative to a base of 
around 38 percent, though the p- value associ-
ated with this coefficient suggests that it is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels. 
When we include political controls in column 
(2), this estimate falls to a 3.5 percentage point 
reduction (p- value = 0.160) in voter turnout in 
congressional elections. For presidential elec-
tions, column (3) suggests that the Medicaid 
expansion led to a 1.1 percentage point increase 
(p- value = 0.179) in turnout from a base of 
around 60 percent. When we include political 
controls in column (4), this estimate falls to a 
0.9 percentage point increase (p- value = 0.289). 
Thus none of our full sample DD estimates sug-
gest a statistically significant impact of the 
Medicaid expansion on turnout in either con-
gressional or presidential elections.
Turning to our subsample DD results, we for 
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the most part observe modest and statistically 
insignificant effects with a few notable excep-
tions. The Medicaid expansion led to a statisti-
cally significant 4.3 to 4.4 percentage point re-
duction in voter turnout among nonwhites in 
congressional elections, but a statistically sig-
nificant 3.5 to 3.8 percentage point increase in 
presidential elections. Although we see no sta-
tistically significant difference in the impact of 
the Medicaid expansion on turnout in presi-
dential elections by age, we do observe a statis-
tically significant 4.4 to 5.2 percentage point 
decrease in congressional elections for those 
age forty to forty- nine. We also observe a statis-
tically significant 4.0 to 4.2 percentage point 
decrease in turnout among lower- income indi-
viduals in our sample in congressional elec-
tions, but no statistically significant difference 
by income in presidential elections.
Table 5 presents the regression results for 
our DDD model in a similar format to the DD 
results in table 4. One difference is that the 
rows in table 5 report the implied effects of the 
private portion of the ACA, the Medicaid expan-
sion, and the full ACA (private + Medicaid) at 
the mean pretreatment uninsured rate. Table 5 
Table 5. Voter Turnout, Implied Effects for DDD Specification
Congressional Election Presidential Election
Treatment (1) (2) (3) (4)
Full sample
Private  0.042 (0.037)  0.036 (0.038)  –0.019 (0.013)  –0.023* (0.013)
Medicaid  –0.031 (0.044)  –0.036 (0.044)  0.028 (0.018)  0.027 (0.020)
Full  0.011 (0.027)  0.000 (0.024)  0.009 (0.012)  0.004 (0.015)
White
Private  0.035 (0.051)  0.028 (0.051)  0.015 (0.017)  0.013 (0.016)
Medicaid  –0.003 (0.060)  –0.010 (0.059)  0.001 (0.024)  –0.008 (0.024)
Full  0.032 (0.034)  0.018 (0.031)  0.017 (0.015)  0.005 (0.019)
Nonwhite
Private  0.054** (0.026)  0.053* (0.027)  0.008 (0.020)  0.002 (0.022)
Medicaid  –0.088** (0.036)  –0.092** (0.036)  0.047 (0.044)  0.064 (0.055)
Full  –0.034 (0.023)  –0.040* (0.022)  0.055 (0.036)  0.066 (0.048)
Age eighteen through 
thirty-nine
Private  0.055 (0.043)  0.048 (0.045)  –0.017 (0.021)  –0.024 (0.022)
Medicaid  –0.035 (0.052)  –0.040 (0.052)  0.028 (0.030)  0.033 (0.035)
Full  0.020 (0.032)  0.007 (0.029)  0.011 (0.022)  0.009 (0.028)
Age forty through forty-nine
Private  0.047 (0.037)  0.039 (0.036)  0.014 (0.020)  0.015 (0.020)
Medicaid  –0.037 (0.054)  –0.054 (0.046)  –0.026 (0.025)  –0.024 (0.025)
Full  0.010 (0.039)  –0.015 (0.029)  –0.012 (0.015)  –0.009 (0.017)
Age fifty through sixty-four
Private  0.029 (0.040)  0.026 (0.041)  –0.032 (0.022)  –0.033 (0.022)
Medicaid  –0.034 (0.046)  –0.032 (0.047)  0.050 (0.030)  0.037 (0.030)
Full  –0.005 (0.023)  –0.006 (0.023)  0.018 (0.017)  0.003 (0.019)
Income less than $50K
Private  0.031 (0.039)  0.025 (0.040)  –0.018 (0.017)  –0.022 (0.017)
Medicaid  –0.034 (0.046)  –0.034 (0.046)  –0.007 (0.027)  –0.012 (0.030)
Full  –0.003 (0.027)  –0.009 (0.026)  –0.025 (0.020)  –0.033 (0.025)
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presents only the coefficient estimates repre-
senting the impact of the different components 
of the ACA (for all other covariates, excluding 
geographic controls, see tables A4 and A5).
In congressional elections for the full sam-
ple, the DDD coefficient estimates on the Med-
icaid expansions suggest reductions of 3.1 and 
3.6 percentage points in turnout, but the stan-
dard errors are large, so the estimates are not 
statistically significant (the p- values are 0.489 
and 0.416 respectively). The estimated effect of 
the private portion of the ACA is similar in mag-
nitude but positive rather than negative and 
also statistically insignificant. Together, the es-
timated impacts of the private and Medicaid 
expansions approximately cancel each other 
out so that the full effect of the ACA is approxi-
mately zero.
The full sample DDD results for presidential 
elections, shown in columns (3) and (4), are 
somewhat different but lead to the same gen-
eral conclusion of little overall effect. The Med-
icaid expansion now increases voter turnout by 
2.7 to 2.8 percentage points—relative to a base 
of around 60 percent—yet the coefficient is sta-
tistically insignificant. The estimated effect of 
the private portion of the ACA is negative, but 
smaller in magnitude: 1.9 to 2.3 percentage 
points, with the latter being statistically signif-
icant at the 10 percent level. Combining the im-
pacts of the private and Medicaid expansions 
again yields full effects that are small and in-
significant. Thus, as in congressional elections, 
the fully implemented ACA had no statistically 
significant impact on voter turnout in presiden-
tial elections.
Turning to our subsample DDD results, 
much in the DD models, the congressional elec-
Income $50K or more
Private  0.058* (0.034)  0.051 (0.036)  –0.018 (0.018)  –0.021 (0.017)
Medicaid  –0.039 (0.044)  –0.047 (0.044)  0.053** (0.022)  0.052** (0.023)
Full  0.019 (0.030)  0.004 (0.027)  0.035*** (0.012)  0.032** (0.015)
Source: Authors’ tabulation based on the 2006 to 2016 Current Population Survey Voter Registration Supple-
ment.
Note: All models run as linear probability models on the vote-eligible population (age eighteen and older, 
citizens), using sample weights modified in accordance with Hur and Achen (2013). Standard errors in paren-
theses and clustered at the state level. All specifications include controls for respondent’s age (three groups, 
eighteen through thirty-nine, forty through forty-nine, fifty through sixty-four), marital status, sex, educational 
attainment, race (white, African American or black, Hispanic or Latino), employment status, income category 
(sixteen groups), and whether the respondent self-reported voting status. All specifications include year fixed 
effects, area fixed effects, local unemployment rate, partisanship and competitiveness. Columns (1) and (2) 
restrict to congressional elections in 2006, 2010, and 2014, while columns (3) and (4) restrict to presidential 
elections in 2008, 2012, and 2016. Columns (2) and (4) include political variables, controlling for voter identifi-
cation laws, early voting laws, and automatic registration (and varying at the state-year level). Sample restricted 
to non-elderly adults. Pretreatment uninsured rate, obtained from the SAHIE for 2013, is defined for relevant 
age group at the local level.
CPS Sample sizes: Full sample (N = 186,950 congressional; 184,065 presidential); white (N = 141,564 congres-
sional; 137,397 presidential); nonwhite (N = 45,386 congressional; 46,668 presidential); age eighteen through 
thirty-nine (N = 80,508 congressional; 80,058 presidential); age forty through forty-nine (N = 42,350 congres-
sional; 40,270 presidential); fifty through sixty-four (N = 64,092 congressional; 63,737 presidential); income 
less than $50K (N = 80,497 congressional; 74,462 presidential); income $50K or more (N = 106,453 congres-
sional; 109,603 presidential).
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
Table 5. (continued)
Congressional Election Presidential Election
Treatment (1) (2) (3) (4)
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tion results are often modest and statistically 
insignificant, a few notable exceptions aside. 
One notable finding is that for nonwhites, the 
Medicaid expansion led to a statistically signif-
icant 8.8 to 9.2 percentage point reduction in 
voter turnout in congressional elections and 
the private portion of the ACA led to a statisti-
cally significant increase of 5.3 to 5.4 percent-
age points. Overall, the fully implemented ACA 
led to a 3.4 to 4.0 percentage point reduction in 
congressional turnout among nonwhites, the 
4.0 percentage point estimate being statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level and the 3.4 
percentage point estimate statistically insignif-
icant (p- value = 0.145). In the higher- income 
subsample (more than $50,000), the private 
portion of the ACA increases congressional 
voter turnout by a sizable 5.1 to 5.8 percentage 
points, with the 5.8 percentage point effect 
without political controls being statistically sig-
nificant at the 10 percent level and the 5.1 per-
centage point effect with political controls be-
ing statistically insignificant (p- value = 0.157).
Similarly, we see that most of the subsample 
results for presidential elections continue to 
reveal modest, insignificant effects with a cou-
ple exceptions. For nonwhites, the Medicaid 
expansion increases turnout by 4.7 to 6.4 per-
centage points, but the estimates are not sta-
tistically significant. A more puzzling result is 
that among the higher- income subsample, the 
Medicaid expansion leads to a large (5.2 to 5.3 
percentage point) and statistically significant 
increase in turnout. Conceivably, this result 
could reflect a spillover effect, following which 
individuals whose coverage is not directly af-
fected are nonetheless more motivated to vote 
by broader considerations. For instance, Jake 
Haselwerdt (2017) finds a backlash effect among 
conservative voters opposed to ACA implemen-
tation. Additionally, the ACA provided greater 
insurance protection to those who currently 
have coverage but may be at risk of losing it in 
the future.
multIple HypotHesIs testIng
Tables 4 and 5 report evidence of scattered, and 
sometimes surprising, statistically significant 
effects across the various subsamples. How-
ever, given the large number of subsamples and 
specifications, some statistically significant es-
timates would be expected to emerge simply by 
chance. We therefore next ask whether any of 
these effects survive adjustments for multiple 
hypothesis testing. In other words, after ac-
counting for multiple comparisons, can we re-
ject the null hypothesis of no effects across any 
subsamples?
The simplest multiple hypothesis test adjust-
ment is the Bonferroni correction, which simply 
divides the p- value necessary to obtain a given 
level of significance by the number of hypoth-
eses being tested. In our case, given eight sub-
samples (including the full sample), we divide 
0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 by eight to obtain new p- value 
thresholds of 0.0125, and 0.00625, and 0.00125. 
Such a procedure controls the overall type 1 er-
ror rate, making the probability of obtaining 
any spurious results from the eight subsamples 
0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (Dunn 1961). Ta-
ble 6 reports the p- values from the statistically 
significant subsample estimates from tables 4 
and 5. We see that the smallest (most highly 
significant) p- value is 0.013, which does not 
meet any of the Bonferroni- adjusted p- value 
thresholds. In other words, we cannot conclude 
that any of the effects are “real” after using the 
Bonferroni correction.
A criticism of the simple Bonferroni method 
is that it can be too conservative if the number 
of tests is high or the test statistics are posi-
tively correlated (Moran 2003). One alternative 
is the Holm- Bonferroni method, which controls 
the type 1 error rate in a way that retains greater 
statistical power. The lowest (most strongly sig-
nificant) p- value is still subjected to same test 
as the Bonferroni method—thresholds divided 
by the number of tests. However, the next low-
est p- value’s threshold is divided by the number 
of tests minus one, the next lowest the number 
of tests minus two, and so on (Holm 1979). In 
our case, this means the second- lowest p- value 
from a given group faces thresholds of 0.1, 0.05, 
and 0.01 divided by seven, or 0.014, 0.00714, and 
0.00143. The third- lowest p- value uses thresh-
olds divided by six, or 0.01666, 0.0083, and 
0.00167. Table 6 shows the p- value thresholds 
for each specific statistically significant esti-
mate, defining groups as the eight subsample 
estimates for a particular treatment (Medicaid 
or private), election type (congressional versus 
presidential), and specification (for example, 
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Table 6. Holm-Bonferroni-Adjusted Significance Levels for Statistically Significant Subsample Results
Sample and  
Specification Treatment
Estimate  
(Standard Error) P-Value
Adjusted Significance 
Levels
.1 .05 .01
Congressional elections;  
DD without political variables
Age forty through forty-nine Medicaid  –0.052 (0.025) 0.044 .0125 .00625 .00125
Income under $50k Medicaid  –0.042 (0.023) 0.074 .014 .00714 .00143
Nonwhite Medicaid  –0.044 (0.025) 0.076 .01666 .0083 .00167
Congressional elections;  
DD with political variables
Nonwhite Medicaid  –0.043 (0.025) 0.090 .01666 .0083 .00167
Age forty through forty-nine Medicaid  –0.044 (0.024) 0.074 .0125 .00625 .00125
Income under $50k Medicaid  –0.040 (0.022) 0.082 .014 .00714 .00143
Congressional elections;  
DDD without political variables
Nonwhite Private  0.054 (0.026) 0.042 .014 .00714 .00143
Nonwhite Medicaid  –0.088 (0.036) 0.018 .0125 .00625 .00125
Income $50k or more Private  0.058 (0.034) 0.098 .01666 .0083 .00167
Congressional elections;  
DDD with political variables
Nonwhite Private  0.053 (0.027) 0.058 .014 .00714 .00143
Nonwhite Medicaid  –0.092 (0.036) 0.013 .0125 .00625 .00125
Presidential elections;  
DD without political variables
Nonwhite Medicaid  0.038 (0.017) 0.030 .0125 .00625 .00125
Presidential elections;  
DD with political variables
Nonwhite Medicaid  0.035 (0.017) 0.046 .0125 .00625 .00125
Presidential elections;  
DDD without political variables
Income $50k or more Medicaid  0.053 (0.022) 0.021 .0125 .00625 .00125
Presidential elections;  
DDD with political variables
Full sample Private  –0.023 (0.013) 0.072 .014 .00714 .00143
Income $50k or more Medicaid  0.052 (0.023) 0.026 .0125 .00625 .00125
Source: Authors’ tabulations (Holm 1979).
Note: Estimated treatment effects and standard errors are copied from the corresponding cells of 
tables 4 and 5. P-values are based on those estimates. Adjusted significance levels are computed 
manually using the Holm-Bonferroni correction. To provide an example of how these results should be 
interpreted, in the last row, the p-value of 0.026 is significant at the 5 percent level using traditional 
hypothesis testing. However, after applying the Holm-Bonferroni multiple hypothesis adjustment, the 
p-value would have to be below 0.00625 to be significant at the 5 percent level, and below 0.0125 to 
even be significant at the 10 percent level. Therefore, the estimated effect is no longer significant at any 
level. Accordingly, none of the results from the table remain significant after the adjustment.
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DD without political controls). We see that us-
ing the Holm- Bonferroni method instead of 
Bonferroni does not help any effects to survive. 
We still conclude that no evidence indicates 
that any subsamples are affected.
Note that, if anything, this analysis errs on 
the side of being too generous. It could be ar-
gued to define the groups more broadly, in 
which case the adjustments would use even 
lower p- value thresholds that divide by an even 
larger number of hypothesis tests. In the most 
extreme case, all estimates could be grouped 
together, in which case the p- value thresholds 
would be divided by sixty- four rather than 
eight. In any case, the analysis from table 6 is 
enough to make the case that not too much 
should be made of the occasional stars from 
tables 4 and 5. On balance, evidence is minimal 
that the ACA meaningfully influenced voter 
turnout, either for the full sample or for demo-
graphic subsamples.
robustness CHeCks
We next conduct a number of robustness 
checks to address potential concerns with our 
baseline specifications. The main finding is 
that the general pattern of no statistically sig-
nificant effect on voter turnout or registration 
is robust to a variety of specification checks and 
consideration of additional relevant policies.
In our baseline DDD model in equation (2), 
we do not include a full set of state- year effects; 
rather we include MEDICAIDs * POSTt to control 
for time- varying differences across expansion 
and non- expansion states. As a consequence, 
the DDD model does not capture time- varying, 
unobserved state- level confounders, but in-
stead time- varying confounders common to all 
states. To the extent of heterogeneity in voting 
trends within the group of expansion or non- 
expansion states, the MEDICAIDs * POSTt inter-
action will not control for it. As a specification 
check, we explore the sensitivity of the results 
to including a full set of state- year interactions 
(table A6). By including state- year fixed effects, 
our identification comes from within- state vari-
ation in uninsured rates at the local level. Our 
primary conclusion—that the fully imple-
mented ACA has virtually no effect on mobiliza-
tion in the full sample—persists, although in 
some cases the standard errors increase dra-
matically. In no instance is the full effect of the 
ACA statistically significant for any subgroup. 
In some instances, effects of the private portion 
of the law and the Medicaid expansions are sta-
tistically significant and offsetting, but these 
results are, as discussed earlier, susceptible to 
the multiple hypothesis test critique.
Our voter turnout models in tables 4 and 5 
have stratified the sample by congressional and 
presidential elections, and especially for the 
full sample, have found little impact in terms 
of mobilization. We have estimated models that 
pool all election years, since such an approach 
would allow more precise estimation of the 
treatment effects of the ACA. Even with the 
larger sample (and two “post” years), we find 
very little effect of the Medicaid expansion or 
full ACA across our models (table A7). The Med-
icaid expansions insignificantly reduce turnout 
(by up to 1.7 percentage points) for the full sam-
ple. The full effect of the ACA in the DDD mod-
els is not statistically significant for any demo-
graphic group (the largest point estimate of the 
full effect of the ACA is a 1.9 percentage point 
increase for white voters).
We also have estimated voter registration 
models (tables A8 through A13). Broadly, the re-
sults continue to suggest small and statistically 
insignificant effects in most cases. Given the 
findings from our previous analysis of multiple 
hypothesis testing, we are reluctant to attach 
much importance to the handful of statistically 
significant results in some of the subsamples. 
A noteworthy result—across both the voter 
turnout and registration models—is that in-
cluding the state- level political controls makes 
virtually no difference in the estimated effects 
of the ACA. In the few cases when including 
political controls affects statistical significance, 
they do because both estimates are near a par-
ticular threshold. These findings suggest that 
adoption of voting laws was essentially uncor-
related with Medicaid expansion decisions and 
uninsured rates.
We next examine several additional institu-
tional details that may affect the relationship 
between the ACA and voter outcomes. These 
include the ACA’s interaction with motor voter 
legislation, the impact of turmoil from technol-
ogy glitches during the first open enrollment 
period, and the impact of changing the param-
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eterization on the percent uninsured variable 
in our DDD analysis.
One important discussion point is how the 
1993 motor voter legislation (National Voter 
Registration Act or NVRA) might interact with 
the ACA rollout (in turn potentially increasing 
voter participation and especially registration). 
The NVRA legislation mandates public assis-
tance agencies to provide voter registration ser-
vices to every person applying for or renewing 
government benefits, including Medicaid (Mi-
chener 2016). Some groups take a more expan-
sive view of what government benefits means 
(above and beyond the Medicaid expansions 
and state- run exchanges), and argue that the 
NVRA applied to both federal and state- run ex-
changes, even though many states on the fed-
eral exchange did not expand Medicaid (Rho 
and Barksdale 2013). The Obama administra-
tion, in contrast, acknowledged that NVRA ap-
plied to state- run exchanges but did not include 
voter registration service in the ACA federal ex-
changes (Onek 2015).
Given widespread agreement that NVRA ap-
plied to public Medicaid coverage on state- run 
exchanges, we focus on fourteen state- run ex-
changes only. It is far less clear, especially given 
that the Obama administration ignored the 
NVRA on federal exchanges, whether any pre-
dictions for expanding private coverage are es-
pecially useful. All states that ran their own ex-
change in 2014 also expanded Medicaid that 
year. Of the state- run exchanges, six states ac-
knowledged their obligation to provide voter 
registration services under NVRA, and eight 
states had no announced plans to comply with 
NVRA (Rho and Barksdale 2013). We therefore 
classify states as NVRA- compliant and estimate 
DD models for congressional or presidential 
elections, substituting this variable for the 
Medicaid expansions. Similar to our original 
DD model, the model now becomes
  Vist =  θ0 + θ1(NVRA_COMPLIANTs * POSTt)  
 + θ2Xist + θ3Pst + αs + τt + εist, (3)
where the coefficient estimate θ1 represents the 
DD estimate of NVRA compliance on the out-
comes of interest. Our prediction is that, if the 
motor voter act were enforced during the Med-
icaid expansion, states that affirmatively signed 
on to NVRA would have higher registration 
rates and perhaps voter turnout.
We estimate models for voter turnout and 
registration, in congressional and presidential 
elections, for these states (table A14). The find-
ings suggest the ACA’s interaction with the mo-
tor voter act did not increase registration or 
turnout. In all instances, the DD estimate is 
negative for voter registration, the most directly 
affected outcome. In most cases, the effect on 
turnout is also negative. We might expect that 
young adults, given their low registration and 
high mobility, to be particularly sensitive to the 
motor voter act, yet in NVRA- complaint expan-
sion states, registration is falling, not rising. 
Thus we find no evidence that the motor voter 
act increased political participation after ACA 
implementation.
In earlier work (Courtemanche et al. 2017), 
we examined the impact of exchanges that ex-
perienced glitches. Amanda Kowalski (2014) 
notes that six state- run exchanges had severe 
technology glitches and that “the federal ex-
change had its own difficulties.” All six also had 
a Medicaid expansion. Such glitches were 
prominent during the open enrollment period 
for the initial ACA rollout in 2014, but were cor-
rected in subsequent open enrollments.
We focus on state- run exchanges, and exam-
ine whether turmoil through technology 
glitches affected voter outcomes. We focus on 
the fifteen jurisdictions Kowalski (2014) classi-
fies as state exchanges, six of which had 
glitches. Because all of these states also had 
Medicaid expansions, we modify our DD frame-
work by replacing Medicaid expansion with ex-
change glitch:
 Vist =  ϑ0 + ϑ1(GITCHs * POSTt) + ϑ2Xist + ϑ3Pst  
 + αs + τt + εist, (4)
where the coefficient estimate ϑ represents the 
DD estimate of exchange glitches on the out-
comes of interest. Our prediction is that, if a 
state experienced technology glitches, enthusi-
asm about the ACA would be diminished, 
thereby affecting voter turnout or registration. 
Such glitches were corrected by open enroll-
ment window for 2015; therefore, we only exam-
ine the impact of glitches for congressional 
elections, which includes 2014.
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We estimate models for voter turnout and 
registration in congressional elections for these 
fifteen jurisdictions (table A15). The findings 
suggest that exchanges glitches did not in-
crease registration or turnout. In all but one 
case, the DD estimate is insignificant and rela-
tively small. For the full sample, voter turn-
out—an expression of frustration with 
glitches—insignificantly increased by 0.5 per-
centage points in the 2014 election (standard 
error of 1.8 percentage points). Voter turnout 
does not increase for any group due to glitches, 
and only one group experienced a registration 
increase (although the same critiques about 
multiple hypothesis testing apply here).
Finally, we modify our primary DDD speci-
fication by examining different parameteriza-
tions of the local, pretreatment uninsured rate. 
First, we compute the DDD estimates using the 
uninsured rate from 2010 rather than 2013 (ta-
ble A16). When the ACA was enacted in 2010, 
the earliest provisions to reduce the uninsured 
were implemented soon after (such as the de-
pendent coverage mandate); thus, the unin-
sured rate in 2013 may not accurately measure 
the pre- period. Second, we compute the 2013 
pretreatment uninsured rate for individuals un-
der 250 percent of the FPL (table A17). For both 
parameterizations, the DDD findings are re-
markably stable to the main findings.
dIsCussIon
In this study, we explored the broader ramifica-
tions of the ACA by examining the impact on 
political participation. Using large samples of 
respondents from the publicly available CPS 
Voter and Registration Supplements from 2006 
to 2016 and a DDD methodology to estimate the 
impact of both the private and public portion 
of the law, we find little impact on mobilizing 
newly eligible insured individuals to vote or reg-
ister. Our study thus contributes to the litera-
ture by disentangling the causal impact of the 
different components of the ACA on our out-
comes of interest, rather than focusing on a 
single component in isolation.
More generally, this article contributes to an 
emerging empirical examination on how the 
ACA, or Medicaid in particular, affects public 
opinion and policy, polarization, and other 
non- health outcomes. Richard Fording and 
Dana Patton (2020) examine the policy backlash 
(in the form of work requirements) from the 
ACA’s Medicaid expansions, which is difficult 
to reconcile with the notion that Medicaid pro-
duced positive policy feedback, supportive con-
stituencies, and policy entrenchment. They ar-
gue that the full range of policy feedback effects 
can mixed or negative, which can lead to self- 
undermining consequences such as policy re-
gression. Their hypotheses are empirically sup-
ported in an original dataset on gubernatorial 
support for Medicaid work requirements. Juli-
anna Pacheco, Jacob Haselwerdt, and Jamila 
Michener (2020) examine how polarization in 
ACA support varies by both policy choices and 
party in power. They find that attitudes are es-
pecially polarized in states with aligned parti-
san environments where Democratic governors 
support setting up state health exchanges. Car-
rie Fry, Thomas McGuire, and Richard Frank 
(2020) isolate the impact of Medicaid on crimi-
nal recidivism, and find the expansion has a 
small negative relationship with recidivism.
Our findings stand in contrast to some other 
recent work on the ACA (Haselswerdt 2017; 
Clinton and Sances 2018). Overall, our analysis 
does not find significant voter mobilization in 
response to the ACA during the 2014 and 2016 
elections. It is interesting to contrast our em-
pirical findings based on the 2014 and 2016 elec-
tions with the conventional wisdom that the 
2018 congressional election was a referendum 
on the ACA that generated increased voter turn-
out. Several points about such a comparison 
are significant. First, some of our political vari-
ables (such as automatic registration) were only 
starting to be implemented toward the end of 
our 2006 to 2016 period and very well could have 
enhanced turnout in the 2018 election (and be-
yond). Second, Gallup polls suggest that voters 
always rank health- care policy as a top priority. 
According to these polls, in 2012, 2014, 2016, 
and 2018 the share of voters ranking health care 
as “extremely / very important” was 80 percent, 
64 percent, 77 percent, and 80 percent respec-
tively (Newport 2012, 2014, 2018; Jones 2015). 
Third, even though health care is consistently 
ranked as a high priority, it may have been 
more salient in 2018. In 2014, when President 
Barack Obama was in office, it was clear that 
ACA repeal efforts would not survive a veto. In 
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2016, the election of President Donald J. Trump 
was a shock, and voters would not have antici-
pated serious repeal efforts under a Clinton 
presidency. In contrast, by 2018, President 
Trump had the opportunity to work with a Re-
publican House and Senate, and almost suc-
ceeded in a skinny repeal in July 2017. In addi-
tion, three fairly conservative states had 
Medicaid expansions on the ballot in 2018. As 
a consequence, both the gains and losses from 
the ACA were far more salient, which might 
suggest a heterogeneous treatment effect.
Nonetheless, it is not clear that the skinny 
repeal or state- level Medicaid expansions (or 
Medicaid work requirements) mobilized voters, 
versus the 2018 turnout (and outcome) being a 
more general referendum on Trump’s presi-
dency. Issues such as polarization, immigra-
tion, gun violence, and sexual harassment on 
the one hand, and the booming economy and 
Supreme Court appointments on the other, are 
likely to have affected turnout as well. Thus, 
even with the heightened salience in 2018, we 
would be reluctant to ascribe the turnout as pri-
marily an ACA mobilization effect. This sug-
gests the need for more research incorporating 
2018 data from the CPS and other data sources. 
One limitation of the CPS is that its measures 
of political participation do not allow us to ex-
amine attitudes or ideology, and thus we are 
not able to observe whether changes in turnout 
across various subgroups was concentrated 
among Democrats or Republicans (which 
would suggest a backlash to repeal efforts).
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